The key differences between Tuchel and Southgate's England teams

England's opening World Cup match - a 4-2 win over Croatia - was an intense 90 minutes that was a departure from the more measured approach fans had become used to under Gareth Southgate.

Football is ultimately about results, of course, and Southgate turned England into an international team capable of making deep runs in tournaments - leading them to the final of the European Championship in both 2021 and 2024.

But for many, style matters too.

Here we take a closer look at the similarities and differences between the approaches of Southgate and his successor Thomas Tuchel.

Player first v system first

The most obvious change since Tuchel's appointment has been his willingness to leave star names out of the squad.

At times during Euro 2024, Southgate's England had Phil Foden on the left wing, Cole Palmer in attacking midfield and Trent Alexander-Arnold in holding midfield.

Tuchel left all three out of his World Cup squad.

In simple terms, this can be explained as Tuchel taking a system-first approach while Southgate took a player-first approach.

Tuchel decided on a clear system and a set of tactics he wanted to use, then looked at the players who could best carry out the roles he wanted - irrespective of name.

It is one of the reasons Morgan Rogers - more suited to what Tuchel wants from his number 10 - was picked over Foden and Palmer.

Southgate appeared to look at the best individuals he could select before trying to build a system around them, and at times was questioned for shoehorning players into roles they were not perfect fits for.

That is partly why we saw changes to the starting XI and system mid-tournament under Southgate.

Both approaches have proved successful throughout football and come with their own pros and cons.

While Tuchel has created a system in which each player's role is clear, Southgate instead encouraged individuals to solve problems - reading the game as it happened.

Including big names across the pitch therefore made sense, with their individual quality helping England produce game-changing moments. Think Jude Bellingham's bicycle kick against Slovakia, or the long-range finish from Cole Palmer against Spain.

Bellingham did score an individually brilliant goal in last week's opener against Croatia, but it came on the back of a well-worked attacking routine England have developed over the course of Tuchel's reign. It's a move that, in theory, also works with Rogers in Bellingham's role.

Without Alexander-Arnold's through-balls, Foden's long shots and Palmer's creativity, England's current squad has perhaps slightly less individual game-breaking quality - but Tuchel will hope those he has selected will combine to produce a greater collective performance.

Analysing their styles of play

Tuchel's game model for England is built on a few core ideas. In November, assistant coach Anthony Barry told the Guardian the modern game needed a new approach.

"There are emotional wins you can get as a coach in the first and final thirds - playing out from the back, pressing from the front," he said. "But in the middle area of the pitch, those 24 metres, we feel the game has become stuck, particularly in the Premier League.

"Everybody has so much information now. They know how to set up - mid-blocks, deep blocks. We are really trying to focus on accelerating the game across those 24 metres."

Watching the Croatia game back, that was easy to see.

Pickford had 72 touches as Tuchel's men went backwards to entice Croatia to step out before playing forward quickly into the runners in behind.

That game, in particular, highlighted two clear differences to the Southgate era.

The first being the speed of play through the middle third.

Southgate's sides, perhaps more traditionally, built up short - looking to progress the ball more slowly. They wanted to keep the ball, move up the pitch as a unit before - when pinning the opposition in their own third - trying to break down the low block.

That worked particularly well against teams who conceded control and were reluctant to press high.

But with football always developing, games towards the end of Southgate's reign featured England facing increasingly clever defensive tactics. We saw braver mid-blocks and, at times, teams pressing higher. This is in line with the rise in man-to-man pressure we've seen become more common in club football.

The second difference was the manner in which the team looked to solve tactical dilemmas.

For Tuchel, clever and more aggressive defensive tactics are countered through specific patterns and planned solutions.

Against Croatia, as England passed the ball backwards, Declan Rice moved into a wide-left position vacating the centre of the pitch for Harry Kane to drop into alongside Elliot Anderson. Bellingham pushed forward into the last line.

These movements were automatic but worked to undo Croatia's press. After bringing Croatia up the pitch, the moves ended with Kane or Anderson playing it long into Bellingham, Anthony Gordon or Noni Madueke.

Coaches prescribe solutions for players, who are selected to execute those ideas. That is put in a simplistic way, but is the Tuchel way.

Southgate, when faced with a similar mid-block shape, would rely on the players he'd selected to solve the problem in a more intuitive manner.

This approach was harder for opponents to prepare for, with Alexander-Arnold and Kobbie Mainoo able to come up with different ways to progress the ball - but without specific direction, players could become stuck against well-prepared defences in an increasingly tactical sport.

The rotation England used against Croatia, of course, won't be a surprise for their next opponents.

Will Tuchel's appetite for risk pay off?

In the coaching world, there is a maxim some believe in - that teams are built in the image of their coaches.

Southgate was impressively able to steady the ship before pushing them extremely close to glory. He did so in a highly pragmatic manner. His sides didn't create end-to-end affairs as though it might have increased their chances of scoring, it would also have increased the likelihood of them turning the ball over and conceding.

By reducing variance and keeping the game tight, eventually England's quality would shine through. Against top-level quality, their collective tactical ideas could appear undercooked.

When they did go ahead, one critique was they would look to defend their lead rather than build it - just look at the Euro 2020 final as one example.

Tuchel's appetite for risk is greater. England's substitutes against Croatia were like for like in profile rather than changing the dynamic or balance of the team.

Yes, they looked more fragile than Southgate's side defensively. But it's a trade-off many fans will be willing to accept.